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by Oscar Cerda, senior analyst, Supervision and Regulation; Elijah Brewer III, senior economist and assistant vice president; and
Douglas D. Evanoff, senior financial economist and vice president
How do financial firms respond to changing credit and market conditions? Should
regulation and supervision be used to smooth out the business cycle? These and other
important issues relating to the interplay between the financial sector, regulation, and
the economy were addressed by industry participants, regulators, policymakers, and
academics at the Chicago Fed’s 2002 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition.
Chairman Greenspan dis-
cussed the implications of
regulatory and supervisory
policies both for the macro-
economy and for financial
markets and cyclical stability.
On May 8–10, 2002, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago hosted its 38th annu-
al Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition. The conference theme,
“Financial Market Behavior and Appro-
priate Regulation over the Business
Cycle,” centered on the impact the finan-
cial sector has on the business cycle and
what policy alternatives may be appro-
priate to modify that impact. Recently,
the financial sector has been thought
to be contributing to the swings in eco-
nomic activity. Given the expansion of
financial engineering and technologi-
cal innovation, developments within the
financial sector can easily and quickly
be transmitted to the real sector of the
economy. This Chicago Fed Letter summa-
rizes some of the conference discussions.1
Chicago Fed President Michael H.
Moskow opened by emphasizing the
need to “understand the forces that drive
financial firm behavior and how firms
respond to changing credit and market
conditions.” “It is imperative,” he added,
“that we evaluate the alternative policy
options available to regulators across the
business cycle and the impact those op-
tions will have on the financial industry.”
In accepting that challenge, industry
participants, regulators, academics, and
policymakers addressed the following
key questions:
• Are financial firms more resilient to
economic shocks than in the past?
• Do current or proposed capital reg-
ulations exacerbate business cycles?
• Should regulation and supervision
be used to smooth out the business
cycle?
• What are the advantages and disadvan-
tages of housing monetary policy and
bank supervision in a single agency?
A distinguished group of speakers ad-
dressed these issues—Charles Goodhart,
professor of Banking and Finance,
London School of Economics; Sean
Ryan, managing director, Fulcrum
Global Partners; Karen Shaw Petrou,
managing partner, Federal Financial An-
alytics; and Richard Spillenkothen, direc-
tor, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. In addition to the
conference theme panel, other confer-
ence sessions addressed bank capital re-
form, bank behavior and macroeconomic
activity, and the role of alternative reg-
ulatory structures and practices.
In his keynote address to the confer-
ence, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan discussed the joint implica-
tions of regulatory and supervisory pol-
icies both for the macroeconomy and
for financial market stability. Regulatoryrules, like bank capital requirements, are
designed to provide a constraint on bank
risk-taking. But such rules can add to
macroeconomic and asset-quality cycli-
cality. For example, “…  capital constraints
may induce tighter lending standards,
or shrinking balance sheets, for a num-
ber of institutions at the same time, en-
gendering significant real business-cycle
effects,” said Greenspan.
Following up on bank capital issues,
Petrou noted that while the 1988 risk-
based capital rules introduced by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion were useful in bringing bank capital
and bank risk profiles into better align-
ment, their crude design encouraged
credit risk arbitrage. Under the Capital
Accord, the Basel committee classified
assets into different risk categories and
assigned minimum capital requirements
for each category. Banks were required
to hold a minimum of 8% capital on
risk-weighted assets. However, some of
the risk classifications were somewhat
questionable and the rules did not dif-
ferentiate among the credit quality of
borrowers. As a result, risk was often mis-
priced. To manage capital levels, banks
often sold low-risk assets, because the as-
sociated capital requirements for these
assets were too high. Similarly, banks re-
tained higher-risk assets where the regu-
latory capital requirements were thought
to be relatively low. The effect of this
capital arbitrage was to increase the over-
all riskiness of a bank’s assets. Greenspan
noted the difficulty involved with intro-
ducing quality regulation—“We must,
therefore, be aware of the implications
beyond the original intent of a rule
and consider its associated tradeoffs.”
The business cycle
The business cycle refers to periodic
swings in an economy’s pace of produc-
tion activity, characterized by alternat-
ing phases of growth and stagnation.
Goodhart questioned the use of the
word “cycle,” because it implies regular
patterns that are somehow predictable.
Implementation of countercyclical poli-
cy is difficult because “our process of
booms, punctuated by occasional busts,
is inherently largely, though not whol-
ly, unpredictable, and has in practice
rarely been well predicted,” said
Goodhart. He argued that the most dif-
ficult part of predicting economic cycles
is separating temporary shocks from
long-term trends. “The question whether
the strong growth in labor productivity
in the U.S. at the end of the 1990s was
predominantly a shift in trend, or a tem-
porary cyclical factor, has had a major
influence on judgments about the funda-
mental value of equities and also on mac-
ro/monetary policy,” said Goodhart.
What might contribute to recent pro-
cyclical swings in business activity?
Greenspan indicated that part of it
might be caused by larger adjustments
in lending policies at larger banks. He
noted that there has been a gradual de-
cline in large bank loan portfolios over
the past 25 years due to the increase in
competition from money and capital
markets for large bank customers. This
may have resulted in a decrease in cred-
it quality that has added to the increased
cyclicality in loan performance.
Impact of new capital standards
Currently, the bank capital standards are
being revised by the Basel committee
under the title Basel II. A major objec-
tive is to limit the credit risk arbitrage
opportunities available in the current
accord. For one thing, the new accord
will have a refined measurement frame-
work that will account for differences
in the creditworthiness of borrowers.
One of the controversial parts of Basel
II is the internal rating based (IRB)
approach to capital calculation that will
be available to large banking organiza-
tions. This approach allows banks that
have invested in internal credit risk mod-
els to utilize those models to determine
appropriate capital levels. This would ex-
ploit the banks’ expertise in quantifying
risk and provide incentives for them to
create and improve their models.
Petrou contended that internal credit
risk models are overly complex and that
Basel II would do little to prevent banks
from continuing to play the capital ar-
bitrage game. The new accord “can
create some significant strains during
periods of economic expansions and
contractions as banks attempt to play
the capital advantages,” said Petrou. She
said the potential distortions created
by improperly drawn capital rules were
significant and recommended that less
emphasis be placed on bank capital re-
quirements and more on improving
supervision.
Another controversial part of Basel II
is the intention to require banks to hold
capital for operational risks—defined
by the Basel committee as the risk of
monetary losses resulting from inade-
quate or failed internal processes, peo-
ple, and systems or from external events.
Three approaches to allocating capital
to cover operational risk have been
proposed. In the basic indicator approach,
banks may use a percent of gross reve-
nues as a proxy for overall operational
risk exposure. The standardized approach
segregates a bank’s activities into stan-
dardized business units and lines to
determine the level of operational risk
in each unit. Finally, in the advanced
measurement approach, the bank uses its
internal models and loss data to deter-
mine the amount of capital to hold
against operational risk.
Regarding the basic indicator approach,
Petrou argued that Basel II is using the
same crude approach used to measure
credit risk before the introduction of the
risk-based approach. Additionally,
banks would be required to hold capi-
tal regardless of whether they invest in
insurance, business contingency plan-
ning, and disaster recovery measures.
Petrou argued that ignoring these mit-
igating factors would discourage banks
from investing in them—an outcome
that is contrary to Basel’s stated goals.
Petrou also expressed concerns about
the ability of larger banks to shift busi-
ness outside of the bank to avoid capi-
tal charges, thus potentially increasing
the total amount of financial system risk.
Activities like asset management could
be moved outside of the bank to avoid
the operational risk capital charge al-
together. She reiterated her call for a
structure of regulation that is consis-
tent regardless of whether the activity
is conducted in a bank, securities firm,
or insurance company.
Goodhart concurred with this assess-
ment and discussed his concern about
the potential impact on competition be-
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in the European Union (EU) where
all financial institutions will be subject
to an operational risk charge. In his view,
it is hard to see what good the opera-
tional risk capital component would do,
where it comes from, or why it would
actually reduce systemic risk. He gave an
example where the operational capital
charge could be imposed on a fund man-
ager that had little risk since the fund’s
holdings were segregated in custodian
accounts. Therefore, “the idea that they
have to hold 10% capital for a nonex-
istent operational risk is causing a lot
of concern in the EU,” he said, and
this would likely distort competition
between the various financial sectors.
Although conceding that there is work
to be done on various aspects of the Basel
Accord, Greenspan suggested that “the
basic cause of procyclical bank lending
is less the result of rules (regulatory or
self-imposed) and more our difficulty in
predicting the future.” He said risk man-
agement will not make it easier for bank-
ers to predict the future, but it will tend
to create an analytical structure and en-
force a reference to past events, causing
bankers to charge higher rates for loans
with lower probability of repayment. “En-
hanced risk management, by increasing
our ability to focus better on probabilities,
will tend to flatten cyclical lending pat-
terns,” he said. Greenspan concluded that
Basel II will reinforce “the expectation
of less procyclical contribution from bank-
ing by trying to accelerate the adoption
of more formal, quantitative risk man-
agement techniques.”
Macroeconomic role of supervision?
How should financial regulators respond
to the business cycle? While Goodhart
argued that neither markets nor regula-
tors can reasonably predict turning
points in a business cycle, he did suggest
that regulators should maintain macro-
level stability. Rather than focusing on
the level of economic and financial vari-
ables, regulators should relate pruden-
tial requirements much more to the rates
of growth of those variables and com-
pare them with their long-term trends.
For example “The faster the growth of
bank’s lending books, in general, and
of their loan books, in particular, the
higher the capital-asset ratio,” said
Goodhart. This would have the effect
of regulatory-tightening when bank
profits are high and losses low, and
regulatory-easing during downturns to
stimulate the economy. In Goodhart’s
view, regulations should “prevent banks
overextending themselves in booms, so
that they are better prepared to take
up the strain during slumps.”
However, there were concerns about
regulators’ ability to act in a counter-
cyclical manner. According to Ryan,
countercyclical regulation is “intuitively
appealing in theory, but simply doesn’t
work in practice. ”
Greenspan pointed out that it is diffi-
cult for bank supervisors to argue for re-
straint during an economic upturn,
primarily because they cannot point to
data that support their judgements un-
til it is too late. Once problems are rec-
ognized, there may be a tendency to
overreact. “As cyclical imbalances inev-
itably develop, the typical pattern has
been an evaporation of optimism among
lenders and asset holders and a herdlike
propensity to seek an increase in risk
premiums. As the economy deteriorates,
fewer projects seem attractive as more
of the previously extended credits be-
come nonperforming. Cautious voices,
including those of the supervisors,
become prominent, now supported by
the increasing evidence of deterioration.
In such a situation, the supervisors call
for more chargeoffs and higher capital.
Credit becomes less available, and risk
spreads widen, adding to the pressures
for a further business contraction.”
Spillenkothen argued that bank regula-
tors do account for the state of the busi-
ness cycle. They supervise banks to
ensure that proper attention is being
paid not only to risks, but also to the
overextension of credit. While an analy-
sis of the condition of a bank’s loan
portfolio continues to be a major part
of the supervisory review process, more
attention is paid to the processes banks
use for managing the risks within that
portfolio. This has helped supervisors
to become more sensitive to asset deteri-
oration and to laxity in credit standards.
Spillenkothen also pointed out the in-
creased importance supervisors have
given to information disclosure by banks.
This was viewed as a welcome develop-
ment. “Banks have never been as opaque
as they are today,” said Ryan. Because of
this opaqueness, it is a challenge for the
current accounting standards to truly
capture the levels of risk banking insti-
tutions are taking, as some institutions
are purposely hiding their true risk pro-
files through complex and sophisticated
accounting entries. Ryan wants not only
more disclosure, but also an improved
system of financial reporting. “The pace
of evolution in accounting standards
has been far outstripped by the pace of
evolution in both the underlying finan-
cial realities they seek to measure and
in the skill with which financial institu-
tions manipulate the accounting system
to present to investors an increasingly
subjective reality,” he said.
Role of risk management
One of the objectives of Basel II is to in-
duce banks to create and maintain in-
ternal risk classifications that can be used
to better manage risk and allocate cap-
ital. Greenspan said that “the sad fact
is that the adoption of best-practice risk-
management techniques has been slow-
er than desired. ... What is needed is a
way to incorporate advances in quanti-
tatively based risk management more
generally into the operations of our large
complex banking organizations.”
Greenspan suggested that the result of
the revolution in credit risk management
is the growing ability to measure risk—“Better ability to quantify risk has begun
to give the risk manager new authority
in the credit-granting process.” While he
conceded that this will not necessarily
reduce credit availability at banks for
riskier borrowers, improved risk man-
agement systems will increase a bank’s
ability to measure the level of risk it is
incurring and price it appropriately. As
a result, he argued that “better risk
management and the associated quan-
tification have the real potential for re-
ducing the wide attitudinal swings that
are associated with the historical cycli-
cal pattern in bank credit availability.”
Spillenkothen said that in his view
the 1988 Basel Accord did not provide
enough incentive for banking organiza-
tions to adopt risk-management systems.
However, he added Basel II offers the
promise of providing “banking organi-
zations with greater incentives to improve
their risk-management, credit risk mea-
surement, and management processes.”
Better risk management makes it pos-
sible to identify risks earlier. And this
should assist the bank supervisor in as-
sessing capital requirements earlier in
the business cycle, dampening some of
the procyclical elements that have been
viewed as part of bank supervision.
Goodhart said there is no evidence
that enhanced risk-management pro-
cesses will lead to less procyclical con-
tribution from banking—“I think that
it is just a hope that making banks more
sensitive about their individual risk po-
sition … will, of its own accord, reduce
procyclicality. It is just wishful thinking.”
Monetary policy and bank
supervision in the same agency
In discussing the motivations behind regu-
latory bodies and central banks, Goodhart
suggested that there is a tension between
looking at the micro- and macroeconom-
ic aspects of proposed regulations. Reg-
ulators focus on how a proposal will
affect individual banks, while central
bankers are more concerned with the
macroeconomic consequences of such
proposals. Hence, the question arises
whether monetary policy and banking
supervision should be housed within
the same agency.
Goodhart suggested that the primary
reason for having both of these func-
tions within the same agency is one of
efficiency. If you separate the two func-
tions, you lose information transfers be-
tween supervisors and the central bank.
It is precisely the different macro and
micro views that are necessary when a
financial crisis materializes.
Greenspan noted that financial markets
and banks are part of the same macro-
economic cyclical process and this is
an important reason for having central
banks remain in the bank regulatory
process.
Regardless of the different macro and
micro views on the impact of regulations,
Spillenkothen emphasized that the ob-
jectives of the central banker and bank
supervisors are very similar. Both have
significant interest in financial stability.
Conclusion
This year’s Bank Structure Conference
highlighted the importance of under-
standing how financial institution be-
havior and the regulatory constraints on
that behavior affect the overall econo-
my. As Greenspan noted, “government
programs, too, often have unintended
business-cycle effects. The safety net—
particularly deposit insurance and ac-
cess to the discount window—clearly
has an impact beyond the stability it
brings by containing the deposit runs
that once led to financial implosion. It
induces intermediaries to take on more
risk with less capital, creating what is
arguably the largest problem facing
modern bank supervisors—wide swings
in credit quality.” Thus, the goal is to
create a regulatory and supervisory envi-
ronment in which banks prudently man-
age risks throughout the cycle, business
cycles are not unnecessarily exacerbat-
ed, and the narrowly defined objectives
of regulation are achieved without in-
ducing distortionary behavior.
1 For more details, see Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, 2002, Financial Market
Behavior and Appropriate Regulation over the
Business Cycle, Proceedings of a Confer-
ence on Bank Structure and Competi-
tion, Chicago.